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The Legal Framework of Labor Arbitration
in the Private Sector
Theodore J. St. Antoine

Introduction
As indicated by Professor Morris's thorough historical survey, arbitration has gone almost the whole distance from being an outcast of the law
to being a darling of the law. Arbitration-the use of impartial outsiders
selected by private parties themselves to resolve a dispute between
them-was regarded by the early common law judges as an attempt to
usurp the courts' own function. For a long time in both England and
America, the courts would generally not enforce an executory agreement
to arbitrate. A judicial remedy would be available only if a party was
refusing to comply with an award that had actually been issued. Eventually, either by passing statutes or by modifying the common law, many
states in this country made executory agreements to arbitrate legally
enforceable.
The arbitration of labor disputes between unions and employers
received its biggest boost during the Second World War. The National
War Labor Board was responsible for setting the terms of contracts when
the parties themselves could not agree, and the Board often included
arbitration clauses as part of the imposed package. By the mid-1940s,
arbitration clauses were found in 30 percent to 40 percent of all labor
contracts, an increase from only about 10 percent in the 1930s. Right
now, as Professor Morris has noted, about 95 percent of the major
collective bargaining agreements in this country provide for final and
binding arbitration as the last step in the grievance procedure.
Something like 50,000 arbitration cases take place annually in the
United States. According to figures that are now a few years old, only a
couple hundred of those cases wound up in litigation in the courts. So the
vast majority of arbitrations do not require judicial intervention; they are
18
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handled voluntarily by the parties themselves. But of course the law
provides a framework for the persons administering the arbitration system, and it is there as a last resort if something goes wrong with the
voluntary process. Moreover, my impression is that in recent years,
unfortunately, there has been an increasing tendency to challenge the
finality of arbitral awards in the courts.
In the eyes of many industrial relations experts, the grievance and
arbitration procedure, and the freedom from arbitrary treatment that it
ensures for American working people, is the greatest single contribution
of collective bargaining in this country-even more important than the
economic gains it has achieved for employees.

Legal Framework in General
During the 19th century and through the first half of this century,
collective bargaining agreements were generally governed by state law.
The states were still rather suspicious of the scope to be allowed labor
arbitrators. A typical attitude was expressed in the famous New York
decision of Cutler-Hammer. 1 If the court concluded, from its own inspection of a contract, that the meaning of the provision sought to be arbitrated
was beyond dispute, it would hold there was nothing to arbitrate and the
contract could not be said to provide for arbitration. Today, of course,
nearly all arbitration in industries affecting commerce is subject to federal
statutory regulation, and a very different doctrine prevails.
Labor arbitration in interstate commerce is subject either to the
Railway Labor Act, covering the railroad and airline industries, or to the
Taft-Hartley Act, covering nearly all the rest of interstate industry. Under
the Railway Labor Act there is provision for both "interest" arbitration,
that is, the arbitration of the terms of a new contract, and "rights" or
grievance arbitration, that is, the arbitration of disputes arising under an
existing labor contract. The National Mediation Board serves as a mediating agency in interest disputes, and, if both union and employer are
willing, it provides for the arbitration of the unresolved terms of new
contracts. The National Railroad Adjustment Board handles disputes
concerning "rights" or grievances. Either union or employer may demand
arbitration of a grievance before the Railroad Adjustment Board or one of
the various system adjustment boards operating under it. Board members
are composed equally of persons appointed by the carriers and persons
1 297

N.Y. 519, 20 LRRM 2445 (1947).
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appointed by the brotherhoods, with impartial referees being designated
to resolve deadlocks.
Labor arbitration in most other interstate industries is governed by
the Taft-Hartley Act, and that will be the focus of the rest of this paper.
Arbitration in small businesses engaged wholly in intrastate commerce of
course still remains subject to state arbitration law. In addition, TaftHartley specifically excludes agricultural workers, domestic workers, and
public employees at both the federal and state levels.

Section 30 I of Taft-Hartley
Pent-up union demands for wage increases and other contract
improvements following the end of the Second World War led to massive
strikes in such critical industries as coal mining, longshoring, and the
railways. Many strikes were of the wildcat variety, in breach of contract.
Yet contract actions against unincorporated associations like labor unions
were often difficult in the state courts, since service of process had to be
obtained on each individual member. Congressional concern about this
situation led to the enactment of section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act,
which provided that the federal district courts would have jurisdiction
over suits for breach of contracts between employers and labor organizations, with the latter suable as legal entities.
On its face, section 301 appears to be nothing but a grant of jurisdiction over suits on labor contracts. But collective bargaining agreements,
like other contracts between private parties, had always been regarded as
subject to state substantive law. As any sophisticated lawyer knows, the
United States Constitution allows the federal courts to assume jurisdiction
only when there is diversity of citizenship among all the parties or when a
question of federal substantive law is involved. Since a labor organization,
as an unincorporated association, possesses the citizenship of all its
members, it would be rare for diversity to exist in an action between it and
an employer. In most cases, therefore, section 301 would amount to an
unconstitutional effort by Congress to authorize the federal courts to
enforce state law. As learned a constitutional scholar as Justice Felix
Frankfurter thought that was exactly what was happening.
In the landmark Lincoln Mills decision, 2 Justice Douglas cut the
Gordian knot with one swift stroke of his sword (or pen). Section 301, he
ruled on behalf of the Court, should not be read "narrowly as only
conferring jurisdiction over labor organizations"; it also directed federal
2

353 U.S. 448, 40 LRRM 2113 (1957).
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courts to fashion a body offederal substantive law "from the policy of our
national labor laws" to apply in suits under section 301. This piece of
legerdemain not only solved the constitutional problem, but also enabled
the federal judiciary to develop what can fairly (if surprisingly) be
described as a body of federal common law for use in interpreting and
applying collective bargaining agreements.
Some distinguished academic commentators insisted that the
Supreme Court's Lincoln Mills decision had imposed on the federal
judiciary a task far beyond its capabilities. After all, there are between
150,000 and 200,000 collective bargaining agreements in the country,
and violations or alleged violations of them are everyday occurrences.
How could the federal courts ever manage to handle the potential caseload
resulting from all those disputes? Fortunately, the next set of major
decisions by the Supreme Court neatly finessed that problem, and, not
coincidentally, provided the greatest impetus for labor arbitration since
the National War Labor Board in the Second World War.

The Steelworkers Trilogy
The Steelworkers Trilogy lays down guidelines on the arbitrability of
labor disputes and the review and enforcement of labor arbitration awards.
Justice Douglas was almost embarrassingly effusive in lauding labor
arbitrators for their seemingly mystical insight into the rules and customs
of the shop. The primary principle of arbitral law is that an issue in dispute
is to be held subject to arbitration if it is covered by the language of the
arbitration clause, in the absence of the clearest and most unequivocal
kind of exclusion. In a suit to enforce an agreement to arbitrate, a court is
to resolve all doubts in favor of arbitration. That the court deems the claim
frivolous and believes the union should plainly lose the grievance on the
merits is no basis for rejecting the demand for arbitration. Even though the
court is confident that any sane arbitrator will deny the grievance, it must
still rule that the matter is arbitrable.
Sound legal theory and practical common sense afford much more
support for the Supreme Court's approach than may appear at first glance.
Under the terms of most collective bargaining agreements, "any dispute"-not just any "reasonable" dispute-concerning the interpretation
or application of the contract is subject to arbitration. In ordering the
arbitration even of frivolous claims, the courts are doing no more than
requiring the parties to live up to their own contractual commitments. As a
practical matter, even the arbitration of nonmeritorious grievances may
serve a worthwhile therapeutic purpose, letting the union and employees

22
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(or employer) let off steam, have their day in court, and perhaps undergo
the edifying experience of watching their case collapse under the cool gaze
of a disinterested outsider. In any event, the whole affair should be much
less costly, in terms of time, money, and psychic investment, than a court
action over the same issue.
Many employers and their representatives reacted bitterly to the
Steelworkers Trilogy, feeling that they had been trapped into arbitrating
many cases that they had not agreed to arbitrate. It should therefore be
remembered that an important threshold issue was actually decided in
management's favor. The question of substantive arbitrability, that is,
whether the claim is covered by the contract's arbitration clause, is a
matter for the courts to decide, not the arbitrator, unless the parties
themselves agree otherwise. On the other hand, questions of procedural
arbitrability are for the arbitrator, not the court, again unless the parties
decide otherwise. Procedural arbitrability deals with such questions as
whether the moving party has fulfilled the prerequisites to arbitration,
such as timely submission of the grievance, and appeal through all the
necessary steps.

Enforcement of Awards
American M anufacturing3 and Wa"ior & Gulf, 4 the first two cases of
the Steelworkers Trilogy, covered the rules of arbitrability and the enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate. The third case of the Trilogy, Enterprise Wheel, 5 dealt with the enforcement of the arbitral award once
rendered. What standards should be applied by a court in reviewing and
enforcing an arbitrator's award? It is quite clear that the reviewing court is
not to pass on the merits de novo; it is not to substitute its judgment for that
of the arbitrator. As the Supreme Court declared in Enterprise Wheel, a
court is to enforce an award, whether or not it agrees with the award, as
long as it was within the arbitrator's jurisdiction and is not flawed by some
form of fraud, corruption, or denial of due process. Some lower courts,
balking at taking the Supreme Court's teachings at face value, would add
the further qualification that an arbitral award may be set aside for "gross
error" or other irrationality.
A rather subtle question that has been troublesome over the years is
whether an arbitrator should take statutory law into account in resolving a
3 363

U.S. 564, 46 LRRM 2414 (1960).
363 U.S. 574, 46 LRRM 2416 (1960).
5 363 U.S. 593, 46 LRRM 2423 (1960).
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contract dispute. In Enterprise Wheel, the Supreme Court emphasized that
an award must "draw its essence" from the collective bargaining agreement. That includes established past practices under the agreement and
accepted rules and customs of the shop. The arbitrator is not to base
decisions on his or her view of "enacted legislation." What exactly does
that mean? Should an arbitrator issue an award that seems contrary to law?
Obvious conflicts can arise, such as a discrepancy between a straight
reading of a contract's seniority provision and what may be an appropriate
interpretation in light of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. An
administrative regulation on safety and health, veterans' preference statutes, and the union security provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act are just a few of the many sources of potential conflict between what
may appear to be a mandate of the contract and what may appear or be a
mandate of the law.
What should the arbitrator do in these instances? One view is that the
arbitrator's commission is to interpret the contract and he or she should let
the parties and the courts worry about the law. Some of the best labor
arbitrators are not lawyers, and in any event the law is often not all that
clear. Unless the parties themselves, explicitly or implicitly, have sought
the arbitrator's opinion concerning the law, they are entitled to a decision
based solely on the contract and not affected by other legal considerations.
Another view is that it is wasteful and improper to have arbitrators issue
awards that are supposed to be final and binding but are not in accord with
the law. This view encourages the arbitrator to take applicable statutes
into account in making a decision.
Probably the majority position among arbitrators, and certainly my
own, is that if irreconcilable conflicts arise between the contract and the
law, the arbitrator should go by the contract. The parties have asked the
arbitrator to "read" the contract for them, and that is all the arbitrator is
empowered to do. It is then up to the courts upon review to straighten out
any legal issues. But I believe a lot of this controversy is a tempest in a
teapot. In many cases the contract is ambiguous, and that gives the
arbitrator a good deal of flexibility. He does not have to say that there is an
irreconcilable conflict between the contract and a statute. He can simply
interpret the contract so that it agrees with the statute. In the usual case,
the parties presumably intended the contract to be interpreted in light of
existing law.

Supplementary Doctrines
Persons involved in labor arbitrations should be alert to a couple of
situations which may not be that frequent, but can be significant when
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they occur. In Nolde Bros., 6 the Supreme Court held that a grievance may
be subject to arbitration even though the contract under which it arose has
now expired. An opinion by then Chief Justice Burger declared that a
dispute could arise "under the contract," even though "based on events
that occur after its termination." Second, in certain circumstances an
arbitration provision may survive the merger of one company into another
and become binding upon the successor. This was true in a famous case
involving the publisher, John Wiley & Sons. 7 In other cases of supposed
successorship, for example, when there is no "continuity of identity in the
business enterprise" or a majority of the predecessor's employees is not
hired by the successor, no contract rights are carried over. Obviously,
these cases pose not only nice legal questions, but also such important
policy issues as stable labor relationships versus maximum business
flexibility.
Reaffirmation of Steelworkers
At a time when there was growing speculation among some of the
lower courts ·about the continuing validity, or at least about the full force,
of the Steelworkers Trilogy, two recent decisions of the Supreme Court,
both unanimous, gave a resounding endorsement, along with some further
clarification, of the principles enunciated in 1960. The first was AT&T
Technologies. 8 Speaking through Justice Brennan, the Court set forth the
following four "rules" governing a court's enforcement of an executory
agreement to arbitrate.
1. Arbitration is a matter of contract and a party need only submit a
dispute it has agreed to submit.
2. Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise,
the question whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be
decided by the court, not the arbitrator.
3. Whether "arguable" or not, indeed even if it appears to the court
to be frivolous, the union's claim that the employer has violated
the collective agreement is to be decided, not by the court, but, as
the parties have agreed, by the arbitrator.
4. When a contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability and arbitration should not be denied
unless it can be said with positive assurance that the arbitration
6 430

U.S. 243, 94 LRRM 2753 (1977).
U.S. 543, 55 LRRM 2769 (1964).
8 475 U.S. 643, 121 LRRM 3329 (1986).
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clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the
asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.
The second of these more recent Supreme Court decisions, Misco, 9
reexamined the standards for judicial review of an arbitral award that has
been issued. The case raised the specific question of when a court may set
aside an arbitration award as contravening public policy. The Fifth Circuit
had refused to enforce an arbitrator's reinstatement of an employee whose
job was operating dangerous paper-cutting machinery, and whose car had
been found to contain marijuana while in the company parking lot. The
Supreme Court reversed. Justice White, for the Court, declared that "as
long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract
and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he
committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision." A claim
of "improvident, even silly, factfinding" would not be enough.
The Court recognized the general common law doctrine that a contract will not be enforced if it violates a law or public policy. But it
cautioned that "a court's refusal to enforce an arbitrator's interpretation of
[labor] contracts is limited to situations where the contract as interpreted
would violate 'some explicit public policy' that is 'well defined and
dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.' "The Court majority, however, expressly declined to address the
union's position that "a court may refuse to enforce an award on public
policy grounds only when the award itself violates a statute, regulation, or
other manifestation of positive law, or compels conduct by the employer
that would violate such a law." The latter observation plainly leaves open
some substantial questions, and the lower federal courts have continued to
disagree about the appropriate scope of their reliance upon "public
policy" in considering whether to enforce arbitral awards.

Arbitration and the NLRB
The relationship between arbitration and the National Labor Relations Board has been a puzzling problem for the Board and, more recently,
for the courts. The NLRA forbids discrimination against employees
because of union activity. Many contracts also contain a provision that
forbids employer discrimination against employees because of union
activity or because of race, sex, religion, and so forth. In addition, of
9 484

U.S. 29, 126 LRRM 3113 (1987).
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course, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act contains a similar prohibition.
So, in effect, there are parallel streams-contract and statute-both of
which provide rights to employees with accompanying remedies.
In my view, labor contracts are meant to be interpreted and administrated by the arbitrators initially, and, ultimately and more technically, to
be enforced by the courts acting on arbitrators' interpretations. A statute is
meant to be enforced by whatever tribunal the statute prescribes (the
NLRB in the case of an NLRA violation, and the EEOC and the courts in
the case of a violation of the Civil Rights Act). The NLRB was informed by
the Supreme Court in C&C Plywood, IO that it was entitled to handle a
refusal to bargain charge in a case that arguably involved a matter of
contract interpretation and enforcement. In that situation, the employer
had unilaterally granted pay increases to a whole group of employees. The
contract gave the employer the right to grant individual merit increases,
but that did not in terms include the right to grant group increases.
Nonetheless, the employer maintained that if it could grant increases to
individuals, that it could add them up and do the same thing for a group.
Thus, it should not be considered a unilateral change of working conditions in violation of section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. The Board and the
Supreme Court disagreed with the employer. Although there was no
arbitration clause in the C&C Plywood agreement, lower courts have since
held that even with an arbitration clause there may be cases when the
NLRB can take jurisdiction and deal with a matter that is also subject to
the contract's grievance and arbitration procedure. Courts have thus held
that in some circumstances there can be concurrent jurisdiction by
arbitrators and labor agencies over the same subject matter.
When should there be deferral by one tribunal to the other, or the
"honoring" of the award of one by the other? To what extent should the
different tribunals be totally independent? Once there has been a fair
hearing in one forum, it can be argued that the other forum should accept
the results. It seems to me, however, that different rights are involved:
contract rights under the contract before the arbitrator, and statutory
rights under the statute before the agency. There is no inherent inconsistency in letting both the contract rights and the statutory rights be
enforced. Yet we naturally should still try to avoid excessive duplication
of procedure, and we do not want cumulative remedies for the same
situation. We simply want to make the employee whole for any injury that
has been done.

10

385 U.S. 421, 64 LRRM 2065 (1967).
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Suppose the arbitrator has already rendered an award. Under the
Spielberg 11 doctrine, as modified in Olin Corp., 12 the Board will usually
defer to that award if several specified conditions are fulfilled. Suppose an
employee alleges he was fired for union activity and an arbitrator hears the
case and decides there was no discrimination. The NLRB will ordinarily
honor that award, assuming the arbitration proceedings were "fair and
regular," all parties had agreed to be bound, the contractual issue was
"factually parallel" to the unfair labor practice issue, the arbitrator was
"presented generally" with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor
practice, and the result was not "clearly repugnant" to the purposes and
policies of the statute. I would prefer to have the Board say that this is not a
matter of honoring the award as a whole; it is a matter of accepting the
factual determinations made by the arbitrator, which are also necessary to
the Board's own determination. The Board cannot delegate its power to
apply the NLRA, but it can avoid excessive litigation by accepting the
factual findings as long as it is satisfied that the arbitration proceedings
have been fair. But the Board does not describe its actions that way; it
talks in terms of honoring the award.
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 13 which involved the arbitration of
an employee's racial discrimination claim, the Supreme Court emphasized that the arbitrator's award had no binding effect in a subsequent
EEOC or court action under Title VII. Not even the Spielberg standards
were applicable. The employee was not bound by the adverse arbitral
award under the contract because he had a separate and independent
statutory right. Title VII rights may be considered peculiarly personalthey belong to the individual-as well as exceptionally sensitive, in
contrast to NLRA rights, which are more organizational and institutional.
In Gardner-Denver, however, the courts were told that they could give
such weight as seemed appropriate to the results of any prior arbitration
proceeding. In what has become a famous footnote in the opinion, footnote 21, the Supreme Court stated that if the arbitral decision gave "full
consideration" to the employee's Title VII rights, the award could be
accorded "great weight." The Court explicitly noted that this might
depend not only on the observance of all procedural safeguards, but also
on the "special competence" of the particular arbitrator. Otherwise, the
Court carefully sidestepped the question of what standards were to be
applied in weighing the arbitration record.

u 112 NLRB 1080, 36 LRRM 1152 (1955).
12 268 NLRB 573, 115 LRRM 1056 (1984).
13415 U.S. 36, 7 FEP 81 (1974).
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Subsequent to the Spielberg case, the NLRB turned to other cases
where there were claims of a violation of section 8(a)(3) (discrimination
because of union activity) or section 8(a)(5) (refusal to bargain, specifically, a unilateral change in working conditions), but where there had not
been any previous appeal to the parties' grievance and arbitration system.
In the Collyer case, 14 the Board dealt with an alleged unilateral change in
working conditions that was arguably permissible under the contract. In a
hotly controverted decision, the Board laid down the rule that if the matter
in dispute was subject to the contract grievance machinery and the unfair
labor practice issue might well be disposed of in the arbitrator's decision,
then the Board would defer to the arbitrator and not handle the charge
itself. The NLRB could reassert jurisdiction to examine the award for
fairness in light of the Spielberg doctrine, after it was issued.
After considerable vacillation on the issue, a closely divided Board
held, in United Technologies, 15 that it would also defer to arbitration in
cases involving alleged discrimination against individual employees. In
my judgment, Board deferral in such cases is far more troubling than
deferral in Collyer situations. In the latter, the key issue is the meaning of
the contract, and collectively bargained claims are at stake. Those factors
make private, voluntary arbitration highly appropriate. But an 8(a)(3) or
8(b)(2) charge of discrimination because of union activity (or inactivity)
raises a most sensitive and personal statutory claim, whic'h an individual
may well wish to take to the public agency entrusted by Congress with the
vindication of such rights. At least it is heartening to see that some of the
courts have indicated that there must be scrupulous attention paid to
whether there is a possible conflict of interest between the union and the
employee in these situations. If any such conflict exists, the employee
should not be precluded from having direct access to the NLRB.

Fair Representation
An additional qualification to the usual doctrine of arbitral finality
may be invoked by aggrieved employees. As a concomitant to a majority
union's power of exclusive representation, the Supreme Court has
declared that such a union owes a duty of fair representation to all the
members of a bargaining unit, union supporters and dissenters alike. That
means a union's conduct must not be "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad
14192
15268

NLRB 837, 77 LRRM 1931 (1971).
NLRB 557, 115 LRRM 1049 (1984).
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faith. " 16 Although an individual worker has no absolute right to have a
grievance taken to arbitration, a union "may not arbitrarily ignore a
meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion. " 17
Violation of the duty of fair representation may be the basis for unfair
labor practice charges or a court action against the union and the
employer. For example, even if an arbitrator has sustained an employee's
discharge, the individual could still challenge the employer's action upon
showing that the union had unfairly represented the employee in the
arbitration proceedings.

Conclusion
Members of the National Academy of Arbitrators have wondered
from time to time whether the honeymoon may be over between the courts
and labor arbitration. As suggested earlier, I have detected some meandering on the part of the lower courts. But AT&T Technologies and Misco
provide welcome reassurance. The Rehnquist Court, like the Burger
Court and the Warren Court before it, seems to remain committed to the
proposition that the uniquely American institution oflabor arbitration is a
valuable and enduring bulwark of salutary industrial relations in this
country. My assumption is that the legal framework will stay firm and
supportive for years to come.

16
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 64 LRRM 2369 (1967); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424
U.S. 554, 91 LRRM 2481 (1976).
17 Vaca v. Sipes, supra note 16.

